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Abstract
In financing start-up firms, venture capitalists carefully select among alternative
projects, design incentive compatible financial contracts and support portfolio com-
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ities by designing appropriate contracts and oﬀering commercial support. We study
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1 Introduction
Venture capital backed firms are more innovative, grow larger and create more value than
other, bank-financed firms. Kortum and Lerner (2000) find that a disproportionately large
share of industrial innovation originates in firms financed with venture capital (VC).1
Based on a sample of start-up firms in Silicon valley, Hellmann and Puri (2000, 2002)
estimate the value added of venture capitalists (VCs) to company development. The
strategic advice and the monitoring activities of VCs promote the commercialization of
portfolio companies and help them to exploit their growth potential.2 It has often been
argued, however, that much of the superior performance of VC-backed compared to bank-
financed companies might not be due to the value added activities of VCs. It might rather
result from the fact that VCs are simply more successful in selecting the more promising
firms in the pool of all start-ups. Kaplan and Stromberg (2001, 2004) indeed point to
the importance of both the screening and advising activities of VCs. Quite consistent
with this, the empirical study of Sorensen (2005) finds that about 50 percent of the extra
performance of VC backed firms is due to the advisory support of VC firms, while the
rest results from the fact that the more promising entrepreneurs tend to match with
experienced VCs. This paper argues that the VCs’ use of convertible contracts may be
very instrumental in attracting a better selection of firms.
A good descriptive model of the VC industry should therefore pay due attention to the
implications of both selection and advice for the quality of VC financing. We build on our
own previous research in modeling the productive contribution of VCs to their portfolio
companies in terms of advice and managerial support (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2003,
and Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2003, 2004a,b). However, we now extend this research by
allowing for quality diﬀerences among projects as emphasized in the literature on adverse
selection.3 There are three main diﬀerences with this literature: (i) we allow for only
1See Da Rin, Nicodano and Sembenelli (2006) on innovation financing with VC and the impact of
public policy in Europe.
2See Gompers and Lerner (1999) for a standard reference on empirical work on VC financing and
Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2005) for a collection of policy oriented contributions.
3See e.g. DeMeza and Webb (1987) and the survey of the subsequent literature by De Meza (2002).
Boadway and Keen (2004) synthesize diﬀerent models which mostly consider pooling equilibria. For an
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two qualities instead of a continuum to simplify the model; (ii) we add to this the self-
selection model of Hall (2005) to endogenize entry into entrepreneurship; and (iii) we
include a double moral hazard problem after a contract is signed. The moral hazard
relates to the entrepreneur’s managerial eﬀort in building the company and the VC’s
advisory support to magnify company growth. The result is a quite tractable model
that rationalizes the use of convertible debt in VC financing and allows to consider the
characteristics and eﬃciency of the market equilibrium.4 We show how certain structural
parameters of the VC industry lead VCs to adjust their convertible debt contracts to
attract a better selection of firms and to ensure optimal incentives for managerial eﬀort
and advisory support. At the same time, we are able to characterize the quantity and
quality of VC-financed entrepreneurship.
When start-ups invent new and untested products, the technological risk in making the
product ready for production and the market potential of the innovation may be bigger
or smaller. It is thus assumed that ideas of entrepreneurs have either high or low quality,
leading to large or small market potential in case of success. Entrepreneurs do not have
enough own capital and therefore need outside finance to start a firm. Initially, neither the
entrepreneur nor the VC knows the true quality of the project. Entrepreneurs, however,
receive an informative signal on the potential of their project that allows them to revise
their prior expectations. Depending on the financing contracts on oﬀer, agents self-select
into entrepreneurship, if they receive a suﬃciently good signal indicating that their project
is likely to be a high quality one. Once a firm is started and the collaboration between
the VC and entrepreneur begins, the project quality becomes known. The probability of
success of either type may still be advanced by managerial eﬀort and VC advice, either
to increase expected profits or to cut losses. On average, bad quality firms result in a loss
and high quality firms yield profits.
To shed light on policy implications, we clarify the welfare properties of the market
analyis of separating equilibria see Innes (1990) and Fuest and Tillessen (2005), among others.
4See Casamatta (2003), Schmidt (2003) and Repullo and Suarez (2004) for theoretical analysis on
the role of convertible instruments. Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) and Cumming (2005) document the
empirical importance of convertible instruments in VC financing. Cumming (2006) empirically shows
that diﬀerent securities do indeed attract diﬀerent types of firms in VC financing.
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equilibrium with respect to self-selected entry and the managerial and advisory eﬀort
levels. Entry determines the average quality of start-ups, while eﬀort levels determine the
success probability of each type of firm. We find that the double moral hazard between
entrepreneurs and VCs leads to an ineﬃciently low eﬀort level. The reasons for this
underinvestment are well known from our own previous research, or from the analysis of
Schmidt (2003) and Inderst and Müller (2004). Since an entrepreneur has insuﬃcient own
resources to start a project, she needs outside finance and must share the returns with the
financier. Consequently, during the start-up phase, the entrepreneur and VC must each
bear the full cost of their own eﬀort, but must share the returns to eﬀort among them.
On the other hand, entrepreneurial entry is excessive. VCs incur a loss on bad projects
and need to cross-subsidize them with profits from good projects. Limited liability pre-
vents entrepreneurs from paying for these losses. As a result of cross-subsidization, en-
trepreneurs who are endowed with a project which with high probability is bad get a too
favorable deal. They are thus too eager to start a firm which should not get started. This
result is in line with the adverse selection models of DeMeza and Webb (1987, 2002).
The policy implications are immediate. The model calls for higher quality, but a
smaller number of start-up firms. To improve the eﬃciency of the market equilibrium,
one needs to look for policies that are able to stimulate eﬀort, but at the same time reduce
entry into VC-backed entrepreneurship.
The next section sets up the model and analyzes the constrained optimal allocation.
Section 3 derives market equilibrium and investigates its eﬃciency properties by compar-
ing it to the optimal allocation. Section 4 discusses the results of comparative statics
analysis of the industry equilibrium with respect to key taste and technology parameters.
Finally, section 5 concludes and points out possible avenues for future research.
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2 The Model
2.1 Overview
Potential entrepreneurs have ideas for new products, either good or bad, but are endowed
with limited own wealth, k. To start a firm, they need outside finance, since the necessary
capital investment I > k exceeds their own capital. Entrepreneurs lack not only suﬃ-
cient capital, but also managerial experience. They would thus benefit from professional
support of seasoned VCs who have industry knowledge, can give advice and add value by
sharing their commercial know-how.
VC financing of new firms involves the following sequence of events: (i) VCs oﬀer
outside financing, covering at least I − k, and announce the contract. (ii) Agents have
an idea for a project which may be good or bad, j ∈ {G,B}. The true share of good
projects is ε but agents do not know in advance whether their project is good. They
do receive a signal y indicating that the project is good with probability q. A higher
signal value means a higher probability of the project being good. If y is suﬃciently
large, agents opt for entrepreneurship and apply for outside finance. If not, they turn to
alternative employment in industry, earning a fixed wage w and deriving end of period
wealth w + k.5 (iii) After the business is launched and investment I is sunk, the true
quality of the project is revealed to both VC and entrepreneur as a result of their early
collaboration. (iv) Knowing quality, agents spend eﬀort and advice to boost the success
probability. Even if the project turns out to have low potential, eﬀort is spent in order
to limit expected losses. (v) Good and bad projects yield outcome vG or vB, if successful,
and the payments according to the terms of contract are executed.
2.2 Venture Capital Financing
In the following we explain in detail the determinants of project success; the parameters
of the financial contract; expected marginal and average quality of start-up firms; their
surpluses; and GDP and welfare.
5Interest on assets is normalized to zero.
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2.2.1 Project Success
If a project succeeds, it generates a value vG > vB on the output market. When it fails,
revenue is zero, leaving expected revenue pjvj. The success probability pj is specific to
the type which is revealed after the project starts. Depending on its type, the success
probability of the firm is enhanced by the entrepreneur’s eﬀort and the degree of VC
support. To simplify, we assume that managerial eﬀort is discrete and can be either high
or low, lj ∈ {0, 1}. The entrepreneur’s eﬀort is thus critical for the success chances of the
firm. The company will always fail if the entrepreneur shirks and puts in low eﬀort. VC
advice aj is a more gradual matter and is treated as a continuous variable. Both eﬀorts
determine the success probability,
pj = p (lj , aj) = lj · (aj)α , 0 < α < 1. (1)
The key condition is that pj is increasing in each eﬀort level and strictly concave in VC
advice. Eﬀorts are complements.
2.2.2 Contract Parameters and Project Rents
When the VC oﬀers a contract, she does not yet know the type of the company, but
she anticipates learning the project type after commencing collaboration. The contract
thus includes a convertible option that can be exercised when this information becomes
available after the investment is sunk, but before the outcome is realized.
Specifically, the contract consists of (i) a credit I − k and a possible supplementary
payment bB; (ii) a VC share sB of profits if the project turns out bad;6 and (iii) an option
to increase the equity stake to sG > sB at a conversion price b ≡ bG − bB, if the project
turns out good. The option can be exercised after the project is started and its type is
revealed to both parties. Whatever the type, both agents receive a zero repayment if the
project fails and yields no revenue. The VC thus gets paid back only in case of success.
6The upfront payment bB will in fact be optimally set to zero in the most realistic case. The amount
sBvB can thus be interpreted as a debt repayment on the initial credit I − k, leaving vB − sBvB to the
entrepreneur in case of success.
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After learning the type of the project through early collaboration, and after possibly
adjusting the profit share, eﬀorts aj and lj can be tailored to the particular project type,
giving a success rate pj as in (1). Agents choose their own eﬀort, taking the input by the
other party as given, and thereby maximize the rent
REj = maxlj p (lj, aj) · (1− sj) · vj − βlj,
RFj = maxaj p (lj, aj) · sj · vj − γaj, (2)
Rj = REj +R
F
j = p (lj, aj) · vj − βlj − γaj.
The superscripts E and F refer to entrepreneurs and VC financiers, while parameters
β and γ measure the cost per unit of eﬀort exerted by the entrepreneur and the VC,
respectively. Since the success probability is concave in advice, VCs can expect a rent
which compensates them for their eﬀort cost and earlier pecuniary expenses.
Of the uniform capital investment I a part k is financed out of the entrepreneur’s
wealth and I − k by the VC. Apart from this credit, the contract thus specifies profit
shares sj and fixed payments bj. As will be clear later, optimality could necessitate
a negative price bB < 0 or a payment from the entrepreneur to the VC, but this is
prevented by limited liability. Hence we require bB ≥ 0. Taking account of the payment
bj, the entrepreneur expects a total value REj + bj while the VC claims R
F
j − bj.
2.2.3 Occupational Choice and Signals
Agents are endowed with good or bad ideas. Nobody knows in advance whether an idea
is good or bad, not even the entrepreneur herself. The true proportion of good ideas in
the population is ε, whence the fraction 1−ε of agents are endowed with a bad idea. The
share ε is the prior probability for a high quality project for all potential entrepreneurs.
However, agents receive a signal y that is positively correlated with their project’s
quality. Those with a better signal are more likely to have a good idea, q0 > q for y0 > y.
The individual agent updates her perceived probability of a good idea to q (y), giving a
probability 1− q(y) of being stuck with a bad idea. Even though agents are identical in
other respects, they diﬀer continuously in the signal received and therefore in the expected
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project quality q. For an agent with a relatively high signal, q(y) > ε; conversely q(y) < ε
for an agent with a relatively low signal. Given a marginal probability q of an agent
with signal y, the average probability Q of having a good project among all agents with
signals y0 > y fulfils Q > q. Also, the average quality increases with the marginal quality,
dQ/dq > 0. Appendix A explains the details.7 From now on, we mean by the quality of
a project the perceived probability that it is of a good type.
2.2.4 Surpluses in Start-up Firms
When an agent contemplates entrepreneurship, she reckons with two possible events: (i)
with probability q, her project is good and has value REG + bG; (ii) with probability 1− q,
it is bad but is financed nevertheless, yielding REB + bB, where bB > 0. In both cases,
the entrepreneur gives up k to pay part of I. The signal must be suﬃciently good to
warrant entry, q
¡
REG + bG
¢
+ (1− q)
¡
REB + bB
¢
≥ w + k. The expected surpluses of the
entrepreneur and VC, and their joint surplus are then
πE =
P
j qj ·
¡
REj + bj
¢
− k − w,
πF =
P
j qj ·
¡
RFj − bj
¢
− (I − k) , (3)
π = πF + πE =
P
j qj ·Rj − w − I.
To simplify notation we use qj meaning qG = q and qB = 1− q. Using the same notation
Qj for the average likelihood of good and bad projects, respectively, we obtain the average
surpluses over all projects financed. Appendix B gives details:
ΠE =
P
j Qj ·
¡
REj + bj
¢
− k − w,
ΠF =
P
j Qj ·
¡
RFj − bj
¢
− (I − k) , (4)
Π = ΠE +ΠF =
P
j Qj ·Rj − w − I.
7By assuming a specific functional form of the distribution of signals in the population as in (A.8),
one can conveniently derive a closed form expression for average quality as in (A.10): Q = qq+(1−q)θ > q,
where θ < 1 parameterizes the information content of the signal. If θ = 1, the signal is not informative
and agents cannot update their prior probability ε. In this case, all would expect a good project with the
same probability q = ε, implying Q = ε as well. If the signal is informative, θ < 1, then the perceived
probability of a good project q (y) increases with the signal received, and so does the average probability
Q taken over all agents with even better signals.
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2.2.5 GDP and Welfare
We close the model and thereby obtain GDP and welfare in the entrepreneurial economy.
To this end, substitute (2) into (4) to get the average surpluses per project,
ΠE =
P
j Qj · [(1− sj) pjvj − βlj + bj]− k − w,
ΠF =
P
j Qj · [sjpjvj − γaj − bj]− (I − k) , (5)
Π =
P
j Qj · [pjvj − βlj − γaj]− w − I.
With population normalized to unity, the number of entrepreneurs obtaining VC financing
is equal to the number of applications, E < 1. A share Q of these is endowed with a good
project and a share 1− Q with a bad one. GDP, or end of period income, is k plus the
output of workers, each producing w, and output of start-up firms, minus various costs.
The welfare measure must also take account of all non-pecuniary eﬀort costs. Welfare is
W = w+k+ΠE where Π is the average joint surplus of a start-up firm. Upon substitution
of ΠE and using the identity L+E = 1,
W = (w + k)L+
hP
j Qj · (pjvj − βlj − γaj)− (I − k)
i
· E. (6)
GDP consists of wealth plus output of workers, (w + k)L, plus output of (good and bad)
firms, net of start-up costs (I − k)E. Subtracting eﬀort costs yields welfare W .
2.3 Eﬃcient Allocation
The constrained optimal allocation q∗, l∗j , a
∗
j maximizes welfare W = w + k + ΠE by
directly allocating resources subject to the restriction that the government does not know
more than private parties. Since w and k are exogenous, we need to examine only ΠE.
With some details given in Appendix B, we derive the following eﬃciency conditions,
l∗j :
dW
dlj
= [pl (aj, lj) · vj − β] ·QjE > 0 ⇒ l∗j = 1,
a∗j :
dW
daj
= [pa (aj, lj) · vj − γ] ·QjE = 0, (7)
q∗ :
dW
dq
= −
hP
j qj · (pjvj − γaj − βlj)− I − w
i
· eφ0 (q) = 0.
8
The first two conditions in (7) determine eﬃcient eﬀort levels. If the VC advises
more intensively, the success probability increases which strengthens the entrepreneur’s
incentives for high eﬀort. Given the functional form in (1), the project never succeeds and
yields no revenue if the entrepreneur shirks (lj = 0). That cannot be optimal and must be
ruled out. Optimal VC advice follows by the second condition above. Advice is positive
only if entrepreneurial eﬀort is high. Hence, pl (aj, lj) · vj > β must hold by the first
condition. Substituting optimal advice, this condition gives a restriction on parameters
to ensure an interior solution,
a∗j = (vj · α/γ)1/(1−α) , pl(a∗j , 1)vj > β ⇒ vj > (γ/α)α β1−α. (8)
Advice is higher with the good project. Hence, if the condition for high entrepreneurial
eﬀort is fulfilled for the bad project, it is a fortiori fulfilled for the good project as well.
One should note that the first two conditions result from maximizing the joint rent in
(2). Rents strictly increase in project value vj on account of the envelope theorem with
respect to advice, R0 (vj) = pj > 0. We denote by R∗j the joint rent with the first-best
levels of eﬀort. The condition for optimal entry thus emerges as
q∗ :
dW
dq
= −
hP
j qj ·R∗j − I − w
i
· eφ0 (q) = 0. (9)
Recalling qG = q and qB = 1− q, socially optimal entry is given by the marginal quality
q∗ =
I + w −R∗B
R∗G −R∗B
. (10)
This condition reveals that bad projects must make a loss for there to be a well defined
interior solution of the constrained optimal allocation. We henceforth assume
R∗B − I − w < 0. (11)
3 Competitive Market Equilibrium
Having looked at the constrained optimum, we proceed to the market equilibrium. De-
riving the equilibrium by means of backward induction implies the following steps: (i)
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we solve for eﬀort and advice and find the resulting rents to eﬀort; (ii) we characterize
the overall surplus and derive the optimal VC contract given by profit shares sj and the
conversion price b; (iii) we determine entrepreneurial entry as it results from self-selection
based on signals and the oﬀered contracts.
3.1 Eﬀort, Advice and Rents
Given profit shares, entrepreneurs and VCs strive to maximize the rent from their inputs
to the company. When maximizing (2), each party takes the action of the other as given.
Incentive compatibility is assured by the first order condition with respect to advice and
the inequality reflecting the discrete comparison of rents for low and high managerial eﬀort.
Quite obviously, the VC leaves a high enough profit share 1 − sj to the entrepreneur to
ensure her critical eﬀort. Otherwise there would be no revenue at all:
pa (lj, aj) sjvj = γ, pl (lj, aj) (1− sj) vj − β > 0. (12)
Profit maximization also leads the VC to raise sj as much as possible until the entre-
preneur’s incentive compatibility condition in (12) binds with equality. The equilibrium
profit share and level of VC support are thus given by the two constraints in (12) holding
with equality. Using the functional form in (1), we compute
aj = (sjvjα/γ)
1/(1−α) < a∗j , (13)
i.e. smaller than the first best level noted in (8). From a social perspective, the VC should
be full residual claimant on her input. However, the need to provide incentives to the
entrepreneur limits her share in the market equilibrium, leading to underinvestment in
advice. Knowing the VC’s stake sj and her level of support aj, we can infer her rent.
Proposition 1 (a) Given the form in (1), the VC’s profit shares fulfil 1 > sG > sB > α.
(b) The VC’s share sj and the level of advice aj increase in project value vj but decline in
marginal eﬀort costs β of entrepreneurs and γ of VCs. (c) The entrepreneur’s rent REj
is zero, her profit share exactly compensating for her eﬀort cost. The VC gets the entire
joint rent Rj which increases with project value but falls with marginal eﬀort costs.
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Proof. See Appendix C.
Noting aj · pa(aj) = α · pj as implied by (1) and using the optimality condition (12) to
substitute for γ yields a convenient closed form for the VC’s rent
RFj = (1− α) sjpjvj, REj = (1− sj) pjvj − β = 0. (14)
The entrepreneur must appropriate a surplus to make her willing to forgo other career
opportunities. Her expected surplus derives from selling the share sj to the VC at a price
that will exceed the VC’s investment costs by an amount bj to be determined below.
3.2 Competition Among VCs
The profit shares are chosen to maximize the VC’s rent which coincides with the joint rent.
On the other hand, VCs must compete for financing start-up firms by oﬀering an overall
attractive package to entrepreneurs. They can do so by oﬀering a high price bj + I − k
for their share sj which must cover at least the unfinanced part of start-up cost, but can
also include a lump-sum, success independent component bj. In oﬀering a price, VCs
aim to attract good projects and to deter bad ones, especially if the bad ones result in
a loss. Since VCs can convert their profit shares sj after the firm is started and quality
is revealed, they can also diﬀerentiate the prices bj, so that b ≡ bG − bB, the conversion
price to be paid if the option to increase the share from sB to sG is exercised, is positive.
The VC’s surplus from a project of type j is πFj = R
F
j − bj − (I − k). VCs try to
attract entrepreneurs with good signals who are likely to have a good project, by oﬀering
a high conversion price resulting in a high value of bG for the same share sG, possibly until
πFG = 0. Similarly, VCs will oﬀer only a low price bB to deter entrepreneurs who are likely
to be endowed with a bad project that might result in a loss. If even the bad project is
profitable, the VC competes for this project by oﬀering a low but positive price bB. If it is
unprofitable, she would ask for a negative price, i.e. a payment from entrepreneur to VC,
to avoid losses that would have to be covered by cross-subsidization. However, limited
liability bj > 0 prevents this, since entrepreneurs have already invested their entire wealth
k in the project and have no funds left. The VC cannot cut her losses on a bad project
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any further than paying the lowest possible price bB = 0 after I − k is sunk and project
quality is revealed. In this case, the VC will have to make strictly positive profits on good
projects to cover her losses by means of cross subsidization and break even at least on
average. To sum up, we must distinguish two cases:
(a) bj > 0; RFj − (I − k) = bj,
(b) bG > 0; RFG − (I − k) > bG,
bB = 0; RFB − (I − k) < 0.
(15)
In case (a), both projects are profitable and the VC competes with prices bj that allow
her to break even on each project separately and, hence, on average as well. In case (b),
only the good project is profitable, and the bad one makes a loss. The VC thus sets the
price for a bad project at the lowest possible value bB = 0 and oﬀers a conversion price
such that she makes a strictly positive profit on good projects. In this case, she cannot
avoid cross-subsidizing from good to bad projects.
Entry of the marginal entrepreneur with quality q determines the average probability
Q (q) as explained in Appendix A. Since the VC might in fact face any entrant, she must
consider the average probability. Given Q, competition among VCs forces them to raise
prices for high quality ventures and cut them for bad ones until they just break even. The
zero profit condition is ΠF =
P
j Qjπ
F
j = 0, or
Q · ¡RFG − bG¢+ (1−Q) · ¡RFB − bB¢ = I − k. (16)
Breaking even on average is possible in two distinct ways. In case (a), the VC competes
for each project separately and breaks even on each of them individually. There is no
cross-subsidization. In case (b) of (15), bB = 0 due to limited liability. Consequently, the
VC makes losses on bad projects which must be covered with profits from good ones.
The type specific profit shares together with prices bj can be understood as a very
simple representation of convertible debt. The interpretation rests on the fact that debt
and equity are really the same in our framework, if we consider only a single project. The
VC provides a total amount of funds equal to bj+I−k to pay for capital expenses and to
compensate for the foregone outside option that is not covered by the entrepreneur sharing
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in the profit.8 The VC gets the return either as a profit share or as a debt repayment.
Define sBvB ≡ DB > bB + I − k as the debt repayment of a bad project that goes to
the VC if the project succeeds. The debt repayment DB exceeds the initial credit by an
implicit premium which must cover the credit losses from failed projects as well as any
eﬀort costs by the VC. Repayment of debt leaves all residual profits (1− sB) vB = vB−DB
to the entrepreneur. This way we can understand the project specific profit share as debt
for a bad project, allowing the VC to convert to a higher equity share sG > sB if the
project turns out good and if she is willing to pay the conversion price bG − bB. The
conversion is done after the project is started and quality is revealed. Converting to a
higher share reinforces the incentives to advise the good project more intensively.
Proposition 2 (a) When bad projects are profitable, competition among VCs raises prices
bj + I − k for the profit shares sj. The entire surplus goes to entrepreneurs. VCs break
even separately on each project type without cross-subsidization. (b) When bad projects
are unprofitable and limited liability binds, high quality entrepreneurs obtain less and low
quality entrepreneurs more than the joint surplus. VCs make positive profits on high
quality ventures that subsidize losses on low quality projects. They break even on average.
Proof. Discussion of equations (15) and (16).
3.3 Self-Selection of Entrepreneurs
Agents who receive suﬃciently good signals, start a firm and apply for VC financing.
The marginal entrant, whose project is good with probability q and bad with probability
1 − q, is indiﬀerent between entrepreneurship and work, πE = 0. Free entry establishes
q
¡
REG + bG
¢
+ (1− q)
¡
REB + bB
¢
= w + k and identifies the marginal quality
q =
w + k −REB − bB
REG + bG −REB − bB
. (17)
8In fact, the conversion price must cover the entire outside option w + k since the profit share just
suﬃces to compensate for managerial eﬀort cost and leaves a zero rent to the entrepreneur.
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Although an entrepreneur obtains no rent beyond the compensation for eﬀort, REj = 0,
we keep these terms for better interpretation. The more realistic case of loss-making bad
projects implies bB = 0 and bG = b. The critical quality would be q = (w + k) /b.
Use REj = Rj − RFj and write the denominator in (17) as REG + bG − REB − bB =
RG −RB −∇ with ∇ defined below. Taking the derivative then yields
dq
dbG
= − q
RG −RB −∇
< 0,
dq
dbB
= − 1− q
RG −RB −∇
< 0, (18)
∇ ≡
¡
RFG − bG
¢
−
¡
RFB − bB
¢
.
Raising the conversion price bG lowers the critical probability q and thereby encourages
entry. The denominator stands for the income diﬀerence that the entrepreneur would
realize, if she could exchange a bad for a good project, and ∇ gives the corresponding
income diﬀerence of the VC. Quite intuitively, the entrepreneur’s gain RG − RB − ∇ is
the total gain minus the VC’s share in the income gain.
When bad projects are unprofitable to the VC, condition (15.b) applies and limited
liability binds, bB = 0. In this case, the conversion price b = bG is fixed by the VC’s
average break even condition in (16),
Q ·∇+RFB − bB − (I − k) = 0. (19)
Recall that when bad projects are unprofitable, (15.b) implies ∇ > 0.
3.4 Eﬃciency
3.4.1 The Entry Margin
We first turn to the identity of the marginal entrepreneur and the implied eﬃciency of
market entry. In principle, one could directly compare the constrained optimal allocation
q∗ in (10) with the market allocation in (17). Since q∗ follows from Wq = 0, we evaluate
instead the welfare derivative Wq at the market allocation. If this derivative is zero,
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market entry is optimal. Rewrite the break even condition of the marginal entrepreneur,
using REj = Rj −RFj and the definition of ∇ in (18), to get
πE = q · [RG −RB −∇] +
£
RB −
¡
RFB − bB
¢¤
− k − w = 0. (20)
Using this to substitute for w in (9), and noting R∗j = Rj if evaluated in the market
equilibrium, yields
Wq = −
£
q ·∇+RFB − bB − (I − k)
¤ · eφ0 (q) . (21)
Finally, replacing I − k by the VC’s break even condition (19) gives
Wq = (Q− q) ·∇ · eφ0 (q) . (22)
The correlation of the signal with project quality implies φ0 (q) > 0, see (A.6), where
y = φ (q) is the inverted relationship of (A.2). Since Q > q, the welfare eﬀect of entry
thus depends on the sign of ∇. If, as in case (a), limited liability is not binding, the VC
breaks even on each project separately without cross-subsidization which gives ∇ = 0.
Entry is eﬃcient in this case. If case (b) applies and the limited liability condition is
binding, then ∇ > 0. Preventing entry of the marginal entrepreneur and thereby raising
the value of the marginal probability q will boost welfare, Wq > 0 by (22). Low quality
entrepreneurs thus get a too favorable deal which results in excess entry.
Further intuition about the reasons for excess entry is obtained by writing πE as in (20)
and using the last equation in (3) to replace w, giving πE = π−q∇−
£
RFB − bB − (I − k)
¤
.
Substituting the VC’s zero profit condition in (19) for the square bracket results in πE =
π + (Q− q) ·∇. If there is no cross-subsidization, ∇ = 0 and the entrepreneur gets the
entire social surplus, πE = π. If instead the limited liability constraint necessitates cross-
subsidization, ∇ > 0, entrepreneurs who are very likely to be endowed with a high quality
project (q > Q) get less than the social surplus. In consequence, low quality entrepreneurs
with q < Q acquire more than the joint surplus which induces excess entry.
3.4.2 Eﬀort Decisions
The other potential distortion in this model has to do with the level of VC advice. Man-
agerial eﬀort cannot be distorted since it is assumed to be discrete, and the VC will always
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ensure the socially optimal high eﬀort l = 1. Nevertheless, it is instructive to treat man-
agerial eﬀort as continuous for a moment. According to (7), the overall welfare impact is
dW = Wq · dq +
P
j
¡
Waj · daj +Wlj · dlj
¢
in general. Substituting the private condition
in (12) for γ in Wa in (7), and substituting similarly for β in Wl, yields
dW =Wq · dq +
P
j [(1− sj) pa (aj, lj) vj · da+ sjpl (aj, lj) vj · dl]QjE. (23)
We have already discussed the first term. The other two terms indicate ineﬃciently low
eﬀort by the VC and, if managerial eﬀort lj were continuous, by the entrepreneur.
Welfare would increase if VC advice could be raised. In putting in more advice, the
VC creates extra value pavj, but can appropriate only a share sjpavj since she must cede
a share 1 − sj to the entrepreneur to secure her cooperation. The diﬀerence between
the social and private returns to VC advice is a spill-over to entrepreneurs that the VC
does not take account of when she decides on her own input to the company. Advice is
thus ineﬃciently low. A symmetric argument would in general apply to the entrepreneur’s
managerial eﬀort. The social return to eﬀort is plvj but the entrepreneur gets only a share
(1− sj) plvj. The rest accrues to the VC. If the entrepreneur’s eﬀort were continuous, she
would underinvest in eﬀort as well. Given our discrete formulation, entrepreneurial eﬀort
is eﬃcient in the market equilibrium.
Proposition 3 (a) VC advice is ineﬃciently low in equilibrium. (b) When limited lia-
bility binds for unprofitable projects, entry is excessive on the low quality margin.
Proof. See equations (22-23).
It is instructive to deliberate under what conditions the distortions in VC financing
could be avoided. If we had a budget breaking third party as in Holmstrom (1982) which
can also be replicated as a tax transfer mechanism supplied by the government as in
Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003), advice could be made eﬃcient. Basically, the mechanism
subsidizes the VC’s revenues ex post until she is full residual claimant on the returns to
advisory eﬀort, and finances the subsidy by a tax ex ante. If, in addition, the entrepreneur
could be made a residual claimant on the project type (to be distinguished from residual
claimant on the returns to eﬀort at the moral hazard stage), entry would be eﬃcient as
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well. The entrepreneur would be residual claimant on the project type if she appropri-
ated the entire income diﬀerence between good and bad projects. In competitive market
equilibrium, this is possible only if low quality projects are profitable, and is otherwise
prevented by the limited liability constraint.
4 Comparative Statics
(a) The unrestricted case. Equilibrium in the unrestricted case is fully recursive. The
VC breaks even separately on each venture, yielding bj = RFj − I+k > 0 even for the bad
project. The VC gets the entire joint rent, REj = 0 and R
F
j = Rj, but the entrepreneur
appropriates the total surplus πEj = πj because competitive VCs bid up prices bj until their
own surplus from financing the project is exhausted, πFj = 0. Substituting these prices
into (17) reveals the quality of the marginal entrant, q = (w + I −RB) / (RG −RB). This
is the same formula as for socially optimal quality q∗ in (10). Marginal quality, however,
will not be the same since VC advice is ineﬃciently low, implying Rj < R∗j . Nevertheless,
according to (22), welfare cannot be improved by encouraging entry since ∇ = 0 when
limited liability is not binding. The complete optimum is obtained only by encouraging
VC advice until a = a∗ which yields Rj = R∗j and therefore q = q
∗ as well. This completes
the solution of the unconstrained case since all other variables are implied.
(b) The restricted case. More realistic is the case where bad projects result in a
loss, implying bB = 0 on account of limited liability and b = bG. One is left with two
unknowns, q and b, and two restrictions: free entry of entrepreneurs in (17) and the
average break-even condition of VCs in (19). Using ∇ = RG −RB − b > 0 yields
V CD : q = (w + k) /b, V CS : Q (q, θ) · (RG −RB − b) = I − k −RB. (24)
Entry of entrepreneurs creates demand for VC finance. The identity of the marginal
entrepreneur, as given by marginal quality q, is a downward sloping function of the con-
version price b. Figure 1 illustrates. The break-even condition of competitive VCs in (23)
stands for the supply of VC. VCs take entry and average quality as given and respond
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by oﬀering a conversion price. The supply function hence gives the break even price b
for any given quality of the pool of applicants. Since average and marginal qualities are
positively related, as captured by Q(q, θ), it is an upward sloping function of q. When the
quality of projects increases, in the sense that a given venture is more likely to be of the
profitable type, then the expected surplus of financiers rises. They compete by oﬀering
an even higher conversion price, until they hit the break even condition.
b
k
q
( ; , )q b w k
− + +
prob. for 
good quality
conversion price
VC supply
( ; , , , , )G Bb q R R k I θ−+ −+ ++
VC demand
k
Fig. 1: Demand and Supply of Venture Capital
The comparative statics in case (b) can be easily understood with Figure 1. The
signs noted below the exogenous variables in the supply and demand schedules indicate
in which direction the curves are shifted when the variable is increased. Consider, for
example, an increase in the market values vj of ventures. By proposition 1, rents Rj
from managing and advising a company increase which boosts the surplus πFj of the VC.
Given the average quality in the pool of applicants, VCs bid up the conversion price to
attract more business, until they break even. The supply schedule shifts to the right
while the demand schedule remains unchanged (not drawn). A new equilibrium results
with a higher conversion price and more entry at the lower quality margin. Because the
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VC is willing to pay a higher price when converting, the deal becomes more attractive to
entrepreneurs and attracts additional entry. Average quality declines.
As another example, consider a change in the informativeness of signals. When market
and technological uncertainty increases, the potential of a new idea is more diﬃcult to
assess and self-selection into entrepreneurship a more shaky process. The signals received
by entrepreneurs become less informative which is captured by the parameter θ < 1
increasing towards one, see Appendix A. People will revise their expectations of having a
good project by less. So the average and marginal probabilities Q > q of being endowed
with a good business idea will move closer to the prior probability ε. In consequence, the
wedge between average and marginal quality shrinks as (A.11) in the Appendix shows.
Hence, for any given q, a lower information content reduces the average quality in the pool
of applicants and thereby forces VCs to oﬀer less favorable deals by reducing the conversion
price. The supply schedule shifts to the left. A less informative signal thus reduces
entrepreneurship. The eﬀect on average quality as stated in (A.11) seems ambiguous at
first sight. On the one hand, a lower information content directly reduces average quality
in the pool, but the fact that some low quality marginal entrepreneurs stay out works in
the opposite direction. According to (D.5) in the appendix, the direct eﬀect dominates.
The net eﬀect is a reduction in the average quality of VC backed start-up firms.
The last experiment we consider in detail is an increase in the entrepreneur’s assets.
When more own capital is at stake, the opportunity cost of starting a firm rises and
thereby shifts up the demand curve for VC. The fear of loosing own capital in case of
business failure raises the required marginal quality q and diminishes demand for VC. On
the other hand, more own capital reduces the need for external financing. Given that the
VC finances a smaller amount I − k, she will compete with a higher conversion price b
to acquire the same profit shares sj. This in itself shifts the supply schedule to the right
and will attract more rather than fewer entrepreneurs. At first sight, the net eﬀect of
more assets on entry seems ambiguous. The Appendix shows that in fact it is negative,
see (D.3-4). When entrepreneurs can invest more own wealth, VCs bear less downside
risk which relaxes the limited liability constraint and reduces the need to cross-subsidize
bad projects. Marginal entrepreneurs thus face a worse deal, and some retire from the
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market, raising the marginal quality of entrepreneurs.
The eﬀects of remaining shocks follow unambiguously from Figure 1 and are not dis-
cussed in detail. The results are summarized for the case when limited liability binds:
Proposition 4 (a) Higher market values vj or lower marginal eﬀort costs β and γ lead
to a higher conversion price, more entry and lower average quality. (b) More own capital
k and a larger outside wage w result in a higher price, less entry and higher average
quality. (c) A lower information content of signals (reflecting increased technological and
market uncertainty) reduces the conversion price, entry and average quality. A larger
capital investment I has the same eﬀects, except that average quality increases.
Proof. Proposition 1, Figure 1 and Appendix D, suitably combined.
5 Conclusions
Despite the fact that project selection is presumably as important as the value added
role of VCs for the performance of VC-backed compared to other firms, the literature has
largely focussed on the value-added role. This paper proposed a descriptive model of VC
financing where entrepreneurs possess projects with high or low market potential. Our
model of the VC industry features (i) an advisory role of VCs that is conditional on the
quality of the venture which is revealed once the firm is started and close cooperation
begins; (ii) a financial contract that is interpreted as a simple form of convertible debt;
and (iii) self-selection into entrepreneurship of those persons who perceive themselves as
more likely to have a high potential business idea.
The proposed framework replicates a number of important stylized facts in VC financ-
ing. In our model, VCs acquire a larger stake in high quality ventures and advise them
more intensively. Since self-selection of entrepreneurs according to quality is imperfect,
some are inevitably stuck with low potential firms. Should a venture turn out to be of low
quality, the firm will receive less intensive, but still positive VC support which is mainly
motivated to cut losses from that firm.
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Our model rationalizes a simple form of convertible debt, one of the most widely
used financial instruments in VC financing. The contract posts a low profit share that is
suitable for low quality firms at a price that covers no more than the capital expenses that
cannot be financed out of the entrepreneur’s own pocket. This part of the contract can
also be interpreted as debt. In addition, the contract includes an option to convert, at a
prespecified conversion price, to a higher equity stake, should the firm turn out profitable.
The contract induces self-selection in the right direction, because the conversion price
strengthens the entrepreneurs’ reward when the project is revealed to have high potential.
Competition among VCs for good projects bids up the conversion price to the largest pos-
sible extent, until VCs hit their break even condition. Entrepreneurs thereby appropriate
most of the surplus from good projects, while they obtain no surplus from a bad project.
The contract is thus particularly attractive for entrepreneurs who have received a good
signal and thus perceive themselves as likely to have a high quality project, compared to
others who have received a less inviting signal.
When considering the eﬃciency of the market equilibrium, we have identified two
conditions for an eﬃcient allocation of eﬀort and entry. First, optimal eﬀort requires that
an agent is full residual claimant on the returns to her own eﬀort input, as the literature
on double moral hazard has emphasized. This is not possible since VCs must share profits
with entrepreneurs. Advice is therefore ineﬃciently low in our model. Second, eﬃcient
entry requires that the entrepreneur is full residual claimant on the project type, meaning
that she gets all the return diﬀerential between a good and a bad project. Again this
is not possible when bad projects are unprofitable to the VC and limited liability binds,
so that the entrepreneur cannot be asked to pay for the loss. In this case, the VC must
cross-subsidize from good to bad projects which implies that low quality entrepreneurs
get a too favorable deal and entry is excessive at the low quality margin.
Given these results on eﬃciency, the policy implications are in principle clear. Policy
should find ways to stimulate VC eﬀort by favorably treating ex post returns on projects.
On the other hand, policy should attempt to restrict entry of marginal entrepreneurs who
are rather likely to be endowed with low quality projects. What specific policy instruments
could achieve these goals is left for future research.
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With our quite tractable framework it should also be possible to examine the coexis-
tence of bank- and VC-financed firms in market equilibrium, for example, by extending
Ueda (2004) analysis of the entrepreneurs’ choice between bank and VC financing. It
would be particularly interesting to see whether an extended framework can explain the
diﬀerential performance of bank versus VC financed firms, and to what extent it is due
to selection eﬀects rather than the value added role of VCs. Recent empirical work by
Sorensen (2005) has disentangled the reasons for such diﬀerential performance. Applied
theoretical work could try to identify the structural parameters governing the relative
importance of selection and advice.
Appendix
A Signals and Probabilities
Projects are either good or bad, j ∈ {G,B}. The true proportion of good ideas is ε.
In the beginning, agents do not know the type but receive an informative signal y that
is positively correlated with project quality. A good signal is thus received by the good
type with higher probability than by the bad type. The distribution of signals in the
population is
Ej (y) =
Z ∞
y
ej (y0) dy0, E0j (y) = −ej (y) . (A.1)
The marginal probability of having a good project is
q = Pr (G|y) = εeG (y)
e (y)
, e (y) ≡ εeG (y) + (1− ε) eB (y) . (A.2)
The average probability of observing a specific signal y by any of the two types is e. Good
types are much less likely than bad types to receive a low signal, implying eG (y) < eB (y)
for y small. In contrast, high signal values are more frequently received by good types,
implying eG (y) > eB (y) for y large. Consequently, the marginal probability increases in
the signal value.
The average probability for a good idea among all agents with signals y0 > y is
Q = Pr (G|y0 > y) = εEG (y)
E (y)
, E (y) ≡ εEG (y) + (1− ε)EB (y) . (A.3)
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Agents pursue entrepreneurship only if they perceive a suﬃciently high probability
q of having a good project. They will thus need to receive a suﬃciently good signal y.
Inverting (A.2) establishes a correspondence y = φ (q). By (A.3), the average probability
Q of a good project among all agents with signals better than y = φ (q) is
Q = Pr (G|y0 ≥ φ (q)) . (A.4)
Entry decision thus establishes a cut-oﬀ value or marginal probability q and an average
probability Q > q of a good project in the entire pool of applicants.
We now determine the impact of the marginal entrepreneur with probability q on the
average probability Q. Using (A.2) and (A.3), we first calculate
dQ
dy
= (Q− q) · e
E
> 0. (A.5)
The eﬀect is positive with increasing signals and probabilities, yielding Q > q. It will also
be useful to get, from equation (A.2),
dq
dy
= q · (1− q) ·
∙
e0G
eG
− e
0
B
eB
¸
> 0. (A.6)
The sign of the square bracket must be positive for the signal to be informative of the
true quality as will be shown below. Divide (A.5) by (A.6) to obtain the desired eﬀect,
dQ
dq
=
(Q− q) · e/E
q · (1− q) · [e0G/eG − e0B/eB]
> 0. (A.7)
We now use a special functional form for the density of signals. The parameter θ
conveniently measures the informativeness of signals,
eG (y) = θ exp (−θy) = θEG (y) , eB (y) = exp (−y) = EB (y) , θ < 1. (A.8)
If θ = 1, then eG = eB and EG = EB. In this case, q = Q = ε by (A.2-3), and the signal
is not informative. If θ < 1, the good type receives a low signal with smaller density than
the bad type, eG (0) = θ < eB (0) = 1. The density of higher signals falls more rapidly
with the bad type so that eG (y) > eB (y) for y large enough. The two density functions
cross exactly once. The relative slopes are governed by θ, implying
e0G/eG − e0B/eB = 1− θ. (A.9)
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The functional form in (A.8) allows for a convenient closed form solution of the relation
between average and marginal quality which also shows how this relation depends on the
informativeness parameter. Substitute eG = θEG and eB = EB from (A.8) into (A.2),
divide the numerator and denominator by E and use the definition of Q in (A.3),
q =
θQ
θQ+ 1−Q ⇒ Q =
q
q + (1− q) θ > q. (A.10)
The informativeness assumption θ < 1 implies Q > q. If the signal were not informative,
then average and marginal quality would be equal, Q = q, as argued before. The elasticity
of Q with respect to q follows from the log-linearization where the hat notation indicates
a relative change, Qˆ ≡ d lnQ = dQ/Q. Rewrite (A.10) as (1−Q) q = (1− q) θQ and get
the log-linear form
Qˆ = µ · qˆ − (1−Q) · θˆ, µ ≡ (1−Q) / (1− q) . (A.11)
As a consistency check, we use (A.9) and write the coeﬃcient of (A.7), Qˆ = µqˆ, as µ =
(Q−q)e/E
(1−q)(1−θ)Q . Using again (A.8) to rewrite e yields e/E = θQ+(1−Q). Rearranging (A.10)
as (1−Q) q = (1− q) θQ, one obtains θQ = (1−Q) q/ (1− q), and thereby (1− θ)Q =
(Q− q) / (1− q). Using these expressions to replace θQ in the numerator and (1− θ)Q
in the denominator yields µ = (Q−q)[θQ+(1−Q)]
(1−q)(1−θ)Q =
1−Q
1−q as in (A.11).
B Marginal and Average Surplus
We first relate marginal and average surplus in (3-4). To get the average surplus over
all projects financed, substitute qj = εjej/e from (A.2) into (3) and multiply the result
by e, yielding e (y)π (y) =
P
j εjej (y)Rj − (w + I) e (y). Next, integrate over y0 > y,
note Ej (y) as well as E (y) =
R∞
y e (y
0) dy0 by (A.1-3), and get
R∞
y π (y
0) e (y0) dy0 =P
j εjEj (y)Rj − (w + I)E (y). By definition, the average surplus per applicant is
Π ≡
Z ∞
y
π (y0) e (y0) dy0
Á
E (y) . (B.1)
Divide the preceding equation by E (y) and use (B.1) as well as the definition of Qj (y) =
εjEj (y) /E (y) in (A.3). This yields the average joint surplus Π =
P
j QjRj − (w + I)
which proves (4).
24
Next, we prove the derivative ofW = w+k+ΠE in (7). Sincew and k are constants, we
need to consider only ΠE. Substitute the definitions QjE = εjEj and E =
P
j εjEj into
(5), ΠE =
P
j εjEj (y)·[p (lj, aj) vj − βlj − γaj]−(w + I)E (y). Since the inverse of (A.2)
establishes y = φ (q), we can take the derivative with respect to q. Using E0 (y) = −e (y)
and E0j (y) = −ej (y) and substituting qj = εjej/e yields the last condition in (7).
C Proof of Proposition 1
Part (a): Section 3.1 showed that aj and sj satisfy the two conditions in (12) with
equality. Using (1) and substituting (13) into the condition on lj in (12) yields
zj ≡ (1− sj)1−α (sj)α = β1−α (γ/α)α /vj,
dzj
dsj
=
α− sj
(1− sj)α (sj)1−α
. (C.1)
This equation implicitly determines the profit share. The zj-function returns a zero for
values sj = 0 and sj = 1, and is positive and concave in between. Its slope turns from
positive to negative as sj starts from zero and moves beyond α. With an interior solution,
there are two values for sj of which the larger is the relevant profit maximizing one by
the arguments in the paragraph following (12). Hence, the slope of the zj-function must
be negative at the optimal value of sj, implying α < sj. The inequality sG > sB follows
from the fact that a higher value vG > vB reduces the r.h.s. of (C.1) and shifts down the
horizontal line which intersects the z-function.
Part (b): We show this by linearizing the system in (12). The notation aˆ ≡ da/a
indicates a percentage change where da is the absolute deviation from an initial value of
a. The functional form (1) yields together with the equilibrium value lj = 1,
pj = lj · (aj)α ⇒ aj · pja = α · pj, pˆj = αaˆj, pˆja = − (1− α) aˆj. (C.2)
The comparative static eﬀects of shocks to exogenous parameters can be uncovered by
log-linearization of (12). Using (C.1) yields
(1− α) aˆj = sˆj + vˆj − γˆ,
sj
1− sj
sˆj = αaˆj + vˆj − βˆ. (C.3)
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The first equation shows how a VC increases advice upon receiving a larger profit share,
the second relates to the entrepreneur’s incentives. If she receives more advice, her own
incentives for eﬀort can be ensured with a lower share 1− sj, or a higher share sj for the
VC. Solving (C.3) for the two unknowns and noting sj > α by part (a) yields
aˆj =
1
sj − α
h
vˆj − sj γˆ − (1− sj) βˆ
i
, sˆj =
1− sj
sj − α
h
vˆj − αγˆ − (1− α) βˆ
i
. (C.4)
Part (c): With REj = 0 in (14), the financier’s rent coincides with the joint rent,
RFj = Rj. Log-linearizing (14) and substituting (C.2) and (C.4) yields
Rˆj = RˆFj = sˆj + pˆj + vˆj =
1
sj − α
h
vˆj − (1− sj) βˆ − αγˆ
i
. (C.5)
D Comparative Statics
Log-linearize (24) to obtain comparative statics results. Define the share δ ≡ k/ (w + k)
of own capital in the total opportunity cost of entrepreneurs. The share of foregone wages
is 1− δ = w/ (w + k). Use this to obtain the log-linearized form of the demand schedule.
The relative change in average quality was already shown in (A.11). Use this together
with ∇ = RG −RB − b > 0 (or ∇∇ˆ = RGRˆG −RBRˆB − bbˆ) in the log-linearized form of
the supply schedule in (24), Q∇
³
Qˆ+ ∇ˆ
´
= IIˆ − kkˆ −RBRˆB, which gives
qˆ = −bˆ+ (1− δ) wˆ + δkˆ,
Qb · bˆ = Q∇µqˆ − IIˆ + kkˆ − (1−Q)Q∇θˆ +QRGRˆG + (1−Q)RBRˆB.
(D.1)
Substituting the demand function qˆ into the supply function yields
bˆ =
(1− δ)Q∇µwˆ + (δQ∇µ+ k) kˆ − (1−Q)Q∇θˆ − IIˆ +
P
j QjRjRˆj
(b+∇µ)Q . (D.2)
Substituting back into the demand schedule qˆ yields the marginal entrant,
qˆ =
(1− δ)Qbwˆ + (bQ− w − k) δkˆ + (1−Q)Q∇θˆ + IIˆ −
P
j QjRjRˆj
(b+∇µ)Q . (D.3)
All results are unique except for the impact of k. Substituting the demand schedule in
(24) for w + k yields
Qb− w − k = (Q− q) b > 0. (D.4)
26
The eﬀect of θ on average quality seems ambiguous at first sight. Substituting the
eﬀect in (D.3) into (A.11) and finally replacing µ yields, after some manipulations,
qˆ =
1−Q
b+∇µ∇θˆ, Qˆ = −
(1−Q) b
b+∇µ · θˆ. (D.5)
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